Abstract. Seismic activity in the greater New York City area is concentrated along several northeast-trending faults of which the Ramapo fault appears to be the most active. Three nuclear power plants at Indian Point, New York, are situated close to the Ramapo fault. For a reactor site in use for 40 years, the probability that the site will experience an intensity equal to or in excess of the design (safe shutdown) earthquake is estimated to be about 5 to 11 percent. The Ramapo fault system, which bounds the Triassic-Jurassic Newark graben on its northwest side, has been known for about 100 years but has been commonly presumed to be an inactive fault. Prior to the advent of plate tectonic concepts in the late 1960's, Triassic deformation was generally thought to be "the last dying gasp of Paleozoic orogeny." The separation of North America from Africa in the Triassic-Jurassic is now generally recognized as the last great tectonic event in the area, which greatly influenced the subsequent geologic history. The hypothesis that the fault is dead now appears to have been tenable only in the near absence of local instrumental earthquake data. Although a number of workers since 1964 (1) have suggested correlation of earthquakes with this and other nearby faults, the data were insufficient to definitely establish such correlations. The recent improvement in the seismographic coverage for this area enabled us to determine precise locations for 33 earthquakes and many focal mechanism solutions. The results clearly indicate that seismic activity is related to faults that trend northeast to north-northeast.
Scientific information and judgment are intimately involved in several of the questions litigated in the NRC hearings on Indian Point. Since we participated as scientific experts in these hearings, we also briefly summarize our views about some of the difficulties encountered in applying the existing federal regulations known as Appendix A, "Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" (7) , to sites in the East. Figure 1 shows earthquakes in the northeastern United States and adjacent parts of Canada from 1970 to 1977 as detected by networks in the area. Since 1970 the number of seismic stations in this region has steadily increased. For the period covered in Fig. 1 the station coverage is more complete for New York State and adjacent areas and poorer for New England. For New York and adjacent areas the detection is probably complete for events larger than magnitude (mb) 2. Since 1974 the detection is complete for mb > 1.8 for the area near the Ramapo fault. We determined the magnitudes (mb) of these and other events used in this report, using Nuttli's scale (8).
The overall spatial distribution of these events is remarkably similar to that of historical events for the period 1534 through 1959 (9) . Both the record in Figure 2 shows a strong spatial correlation of epicentral locations with surface traces of faults in this area. A large majority of the events lie on or very close (within 1 to 2 km) to the faults. Furthermore, an examination of the focal mechanism solutions shows that for each solution one of the nodal planes trends north to northeast, which is also the predominant trend of the faults in this area. This remarkable spatial correlation and the consistency of the nodal planes with the trend of the mapped faults leave little doubt that earthquakes in this area occur along preexisting faults.
About half of the events plotted in Fig.  2 are almost colinear and lie along or close to the Ramapo fault system. The Ramapo fault system can be traced as a single continuous fault between point A and event 26; near event 26 it splays into a number of branches (5, 11). One of these branches (the Thiells fault) passes within 1 km of Indian Point (triangle in Fig. 2) . The association of seismic activity with this major fault system is particularly clear in Fig. 3 , where the hypocenters of events with reliable focal depths occurring within 10 km of the fault trace are projected onto a vertical cross section perpendicular to the trend of the fault. The southeasterly dip of the hypocenters in Fig. 3 agrees with Focal mechanism solutions indicate that high-angle reverse faulting is the predominant mode of contemporary fault movement in this area; this differs from the sense of movement during the Triassic-Jurassic (4, 5, 11). Thus, the state of stress in this area has changed with time. The present maximum compressive stress direction is nearly uniform and trends west-northwest and indicates reactivation of southeast-or northwest-dipping faults.
In a plate tectonic framework, the east coast of North America was located along a plate boundary during the Triassic but is presently a region interior to a lithospheric plate. In a worldwide study of intraplate phenomena, Sykes (12) found that intraplate earthquakes, such as those in eastern North America, tend to occur along major preexisting faults that were reactivated by continental fragmentation in the Mesozoic or Cenozoic eras. Many of these reactivated faults are still seismically active today but, of course, not to the extent that they were during the initial stages of continental rifting.
On the basis of focal mechanism solutions, Aggarwal (10) (Fig. 4) (Fig. 4) . Squares (Fig. 4) the data to larger magnitudes. We estimate that they may be uncertain by a factor of 2 to 3. Using this log N-mb relationship, we derive in Table 1 First (method la) we calculate the contributions to site intensities only from earthquakes within 10 km of the site. The intensity at a distance of up to 10 km, for earthquakes of moderate size, is expected to be nearly the same as that at the epicenter (20) . Thus, the probability that site intensity will equal or exceed, say, VII once in 40 years from earthquakes within 10 km of the site is equivalent to the probability of occurrence of earthquakes of MM -VII. For an earthquake more distant than 10 km the probability that its intensity at the site will equal or exceed a given intensity is a function of the size of the earthquake and the decay of intensity with distance. Approximating the fault zone as a line source, and assuming the intensity-distance relationship of McGuire (20) Table 1 shows that the calculated probabilities are not greatly dependent on the maximum size of earthquakes. Estimates obtained by excluding events of MM -IX, however, are probably more realistic. Thus, the probability that the MM intensity at the reactor site will equal or exceed VII, the design (safe shutdown) earthquake, once in 40 years is about 5 to 11 percent. For MM _ VIII, the probability is about 2 percent.
Method 2 (Table 1) is a more approximate calculation based on the historic rate of occurrence of shocks of intensity VII in the greater New York City area. We take the rate as 2.5 shocks per 250 years since the 1927 event is assigned MM VII in one catalog (16) and VI in another (9). We assume that these shocks, like those in Fig. 2 , occur along major northeast-trending faults, which we estimate have a total length about three times that of the Ramapo fault. Assuming a rupture length of about 5 km for MM VII (23), we obtain a total of 72 rupture segments, four of which we take as being within 10 km of Indian Point. This gives a recurrence time of 1800 years for MM VII within 10 km of the plants. This calculation suffers from our poor knowledge of the lengths of rupture zones for eastern earthquakes and of their extent in depth. Since precisely located shocks in the area have computed depths that are less than 11 km, the calculated recurrence time is not greatly affected by the depth of seismic faulting in individual shocks.
McGuire (20) calculated probabilities for exceeding given intensities for a number of sites near the East Coast by randomly varying the locations of historic shocks within individual seismic provinces. He showed that his method is stable to uncertainties in the designation of seismic provinces and the size of specific shocks. The approach used in the federal siting appendix (7), however, is highly sensitive to those parameters. Differences of up to two MM intensity units can be obtained with the existing procedure, depending on how the seismic provinces are drawn. For a 10,000-year return period, McGuire calculated a shock of intensity 8.3 for New York City under the assumption that shocks larger than MM IX cannot occur. If his results are applied to Indian Point, we obtain return periods of 2240 and 7080 years (method 3, Table 1 ) for intensities VII and VIII, respectively. Some of his other calculations, which probably are not as realistic as the above, yield shorter return periods for the same intensities.
We think that method 1 provides the most realistic estimate since it is based on data from the area of the Ramapo fault, whereas in method 3 a random distribution of activity in space is assumed. Our best estimates are larger by about a factor of 10 than that computed by NRC seismologists (24) for the same intensity; their estimate suffers from an assumed random distribution of activity in space and much more limited data than that used in this study. The 5 to 11 percent probabilities we obtained, of course, should not be equated with the probability of significant damage or accidental radioactive release.
Indian We believe that our calculations provide the public and policy-makers with quantitative numbers against which to judge whether the risk is acceptable or not. It is clear, however, that not a great many of the approximately 70 nuclear power plants now in operation in the United States can be allowed to operate at a risk of 5 to 11 percent without the probability becoming high that shaking will exceed that of the design earthquake for at least one of them over a 40-year period.
The Indian Point seismic hearings before NRC brought out a number of problems about the applicability of the existing federal regulations (7) The hearings demonstrated that the word "macroseismicity," which is not defined in the regulations, is rarely used or defined by seismologists. Various scientific witnesses differed to a large extent in their concept of macroseismicity (28) . For much of the East, instrumental data of sufficient precision to demonstrate a relation to specific faults are very limited in time. Hence, it is not surprising that no fault in the central or eastern United States has as yet been declared legally capable.
In the absence of capable faults, the concept of "tectonic provinces" is used in deriving the intensity of the design earthquake from the historic record of shocks. The intensity at the site is calculated by moving historic shocks in the same province to the site and shocks in adjacent provinces to the closest point within those provinces (if the shocks cannot reasonably be correlated with a 28 APRIL 1978 tectonic structure). Although this procedure may appear conservative in terms of design safety, it is so only if reasonably large tectonic provinces are used. At the Indian Point hearings it was clear that the scientific witnesses had greatly varying opinions about the size, designation, and concept of tectonic provinces (28). These ambiguities can result in a number of small provinces being invoked to keep critical historic shocks at a distande such that their intensities at the site are much lower than those near the epicenter. In the case of Indian Point, this leads to a design earthquake of intensity VII or VIII depending on the designation of tectonic provinces.
The rate of seismic activity along the Ramapo fault and in the East in general is clearly less than that for major faults in, say, California or Japan. Although the federal siting regulations put the question of the capability of a fault as a yes-no decision, the present rate of movement along faults obviously varies by many orders of magnitude. We believe recognition must be given to the fact that some faults are more "capable" than others. Until this is done, the public may well equate the designation of capability with size and rate of occurrence of earthquakes like those along, say, the San Andreas fault in California. In the context of siting nuclear power plants and other critical facilities, we believe that the rate of activity must be judged in comparison to the design earthquake of the plant. The rate of activity along the Ramapo fault is such that it probably only warrants concern for critical facilities such as nuclear power plants and hospitals for which integrity must be ensured at a high level of confidence. 
